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19 JUN 1957



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
Mr. J. Walter Yeagley, Chairman  
Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security  
3027 Department of Justice  
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. Yeagley:

Reference is made to your letter of 3 June 1957 requesting this Agency to bring up to date the information in the following reports which were submitted to your Committee on 12 June 1954 and 14 August 1954:

- (A) Special Report on Communist Strength and Capabilities in the Western Hemisphere
- (B) Current Measures in Certain Latin American Countries and Canada Designed to Reduce the Effectiveness of the Communist Conspiracy

Enclosures A and B attached hereto contain the most recent information available in fulfillment of your request.



Sincerely,

SIGNED

C. P. CARROLL  
Lieutenant Colonel, USAF  
Deputy Director

State Dept. review completed

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2 Attachments

DOJ  
Review  
Completed

Letter to Mr. J. Walter Yeagley, Chairman, ICIB, replying to his letter of 3 June 1957, to DCI.

Signature Recommended:

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**STRENGTH AND CAPABILITIES OF COMMUNIST PARTIES**

**ARGENTINA**

**A. Strength of the Communist Party and Fronts**

**CP Membership**

CP Argentina: 60,000

Communist Worker Movement: 2,000

Revolutionary Worker Movement (Troskyite): 4,000

Sympathizers: 175,000

**CP Voting Strength:** 100,000 (April 1954)

**Strength of Major Fronts:**

Slavic Union of Argentina: 13,500 (claimed 1953)

Movement for the Democratization and Independence of

Trade Unions: 3,000 (estimated 1953)

Argentine Commission for the Promotion of Foreign Trade:  
620 (claimed 1956)

**B. Capabilities**

As an independent unit acting on its own, the Party is not capable of seizing power or taking any significant political action. However, by acting in coalition with other parties, such as the now-dissolved Peronist Party, the Party would be capable of seriously threatening the position of the present regime. Currently the possibility of an alliance between the Party and other major political groups is somewhat remote. The Party cannot effectively influence national elections; neither is it in a position to subvert Argentine's political leadership. The Party is capable of disruptive action, such as strikes and sabotage. However, it is not believed that such capabilities extend to the creation of serious economic and political crises. Acting in coalition with other

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discontented political forces, the Party is capable of initiating and perhaps controlling riots and minor uprisings. The Party's capabilities for conducting street fighting and guerrilla activities on its own are believed to be extremely limited. It is capable of conducting espionage on behalf of the USSR and Soviet bloc nations, however, its usefulness and effectiveness in this regard are believed to be limited. The present national economic and political instability tend to heighten the capabilities of the Party.

### **BOLIVIA**

#### **A. Strength of the Communist Party and Fronts**

##### **CP Membership:**

**CP Bolivia: 3,000**

**Workers Revolutionary Party (Trotskyite): 1,500**

**Sympathizers: 3,000**

**CP Voting Strength:** **Illegal. 12,154 (June 1956)**

##### **Strength of Major Fronts:**

**Federation of Students of Professional Institutes: 12,000**  
**(claimed 1950)**

#### **B. Capabilities**

The Communist Party is considered incapable of seizing power at this time. The Party is working towards the formation of a leftist front with the Workers Revolutionary Party, the Party of the Revolutionary Left and the left wing of the Nationalist Revolutionary Movement. Were this front to come into being, the Party might well be able to wield considerable influence in an election, but at present it is felt that Communist success in the formation of such a front is unlikely. The Party, through its members and sympathizers, is alleged to be, and is probably able, to exert influence to some degree

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on Bolivia's political leadership. Similarly, it would appear that the Party may also have control over certain elements in the Congress. The Party has considerable strength in the railway, communications, construction and graphic workers' unions and could initiate strikes in these organizations if they wished. However, it is not believed that these strikes would be of great duration or of serious importance. The Party is believed to be incapable of initiating or controlling riots, street fighting and guerrilla activities on a significant scale at this time. There apparently is almost no anti-Communist activity presently being conducted by the government. This factor coupled with the government's poor security measures and the number of Communists and sympathizers in the government leads to the belief that the Party would encounter little difficulty in carrying out espionage for the use of the USSR and the Soviet bloc to the degree of which it is capable.

### **BRAZIL**

#### **A. Strength of the Communist Party and Fronts**

**CP Membership:** 50,000 - 60,000

**Sympathizers:** 150,000

**CP Voting Strength:** Illegal. 500,000 (October 1955)

#### **Strength of Major Fronts:**

**Union of Secondary Students of Sao Paulo:** 200,000 (claimed 1954)

**Federation of Brazilian Youth:** (maintains relations with 77

**Brazilian Youth organizations of all kinds) (claimed 1953)**

**Youth Federation of Sao Paulo:** (more than 100 affiliated clubs in the sports sector of the capital Sao Paulo alone) (claimed 1953)

**Union of Communist Youth:** 5,000 (claimed 1956)

**Brazilian Movement for Peace:** 623 (does paying members at Conference in Rio in 1953)

#### **B. Capabilities**

**The illegal Communist Party is not currently capable of joining**

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power except perhaps temporarily in local areas. The major danger of the Communist movement lies in its success in identifying itself with growing nationalist sentiment and its ability to influence this nationalism for its own ends. The votes which it commands are a powerful inducement to self-seeking politicians who believe that Communist support can be used and cast off at will. The danger here is that the political power, federal or state, might fall into the hands of persons who would tolerate the expansion of Communist influence in the country. This danger is in part the result of the fact that there is inadequate comprehension among many government officials of the nature and extent of the Communist threat to Brazil and of corrective measures which should be taken against it. The Party is not now capable of launching a serious armed struggle on a significant scale anywhere in the country. Should it make such an attempt the civil and militarized police are fully capable of dealing with it. Under unusual conditions of unrest and disturbances the Party could ally itself with other dissident elements and contribute substantially to the capability of these elements for riots, street-fighting, uprisings and para-military operations. The Party is capable of causing extensive disruption of the country's economic and social order by means of sabotage, strikes and riots, although it has not been able to launch a general strike. As a result of its infiltration of government, education and labor, the Party is strategically placed to supply intelligence to the USSR and/or Soviet bloc.

### CHILE

#### A. Strength of the Communist Party and Fronts

CP Membership: 20,000

Sympathizers: 55,000

CP Voting Strength: Illegal. 55,000 (estimated April 1956)

#### Strength of Major Fronts:

Chilean Worker's Central: 230,000 (estimated 1956)

(The extent of Communist influence in CUTCH is difficult to ascertain, but CUTCH frequently follows the Communist line.)

Popular Action Front: 130,985 (April 1956 elections)

Communist Youth Movement: 8,000 (claimed 1948)

Chilean-Bulgarian Institute of Culture: over 100 members

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## **B. Capabilities**

In the unlikely event that Communist-influenced opposition elements rose against the government, the armed forces could easily suppress such an insurrection. As far as is known, there is little Communist penetration of the government, armed forces or the police. There is no evidence that the Communists possess arm stocks and few indications of any para-military training. The Communists have substantial influence in key sectors of the country's political and economic life and are capable of considerable trouble which would play an important part in preventing Chilean economic reorganization. For example, they can cause disruption by sabotage and strike action through their influence in the Chilean Worker's Central. The Communists are also capable of espionage on behalf of the USSR or the Soviet bloc and are known to be engaging in the collection of political and economic data covering various Latin American countries. The Communists also possess a degree of political power and some ability to effectively influence national elections through the formation of political alliances, particularly within the Popular Action Front (FRAP), a coalition of six national political parties. The Soviet/Communist attempt to obtain a status of respectability for the CP Chile and at the same time to stir up anti-U.S. feeling in Latin America is facilitated by the participation of the Popular Socialist Party (PSP), a FRAP member, in the Consultative Committee of the Latin American Secretariat of the Socialist International and the positions taken by the PSP in committee meetings. Soviet/Communist objectives of fomenting nationalism and anti-colonialism (U.S.) in Asia and the Middle East were also advanced by the participation of the PSP in the Nov. 1956 meeting at Bombay, India of the Asian Socialist Conference, and the pro-Communist stand taken by the PSP delegate.

## **COLOMBIA**

### **A. Strength of the Communist Party and Fronts**

**CP Membership:** 4,800

**Sympathisers:** 10,000 - 15,000

**CP Voting Strength:** Illegal.

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### **Strength of Major Fronts:**

**Independent Confederation of Colombian Workers: 20,000**  
**(estimated 1953) Currently of little significance.**

### **B. Capabilities**

Communists are incapable of seizing the government by force or electoral means, or of significantly influencing the activities of legal political parties. They are not capable of initiating violence on a significant scale, but do have some influence with some guerrilla leaders. They are able to offer the guerrillas some moral and propaganda support as well as organizational and ideological training. They are able to initiate, and in some remote areas to control, riots and uprisings. There is every evidence that the governmental repression of the Communists will continue and even increase if the Party attempts action against the government.

## **COSTA RICA**

### **A. Strength of the Communist Party and Fronts**

**CP Membership: 300**

**Sympathizers: 2,000 - 10,000**

**CP Voting Strength: Illegal.**

### **Strength of Major Fronts:**

**General Confederation of Workers of Costa Rica: 4,000**  
**(estimated 1956)**

**Alliance of Costa Rican Women: 325**

### **B. Capabilities**

Communists are incapable of seizing the government by force or electoral means, or of significantly influencing the activities of legal political parties. They are capable of disruptive strike activity.

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particularly in and around the Pacific coast banana ports of Golfito and Quepos. Through the long experience, international contacts, and Soviet training of major leaders, they are capable of giving organizational and ideological guidance to Communist movements in neighboring countries.

### **CUBA**

#### **A. Strength of the Communist Party and Fronts**

**CP Membership:** 10,000 - 15,000

**Sympathizers:** 25,000 - 30,000

**CP Voting Strength:** Illegal

#### **Strength of Major Fronts:**

**Students' Coordination Committee:** 9,000 (claimed 1953)

**Federation of Normal Students:** 7,600 (claimed 1953)

**Association of Pupils of the Normal School of Havana:** 3,500 (claimed)

#### **B. Capabilities**

Communists are incapable of seizing the government by force or electoral means, or of significantly influencing the activities of legal political parties. However, through their clandestine publications and infiltration of student and labor organizations, they are capable of heightening current dissatisfaction with the Batista government. They are probably able to stimulate or initiate, though not to control, public demonstrations. By virtue of their efficient clandestine organization and international contacts, they are capable of performing Soviet-directed sabotage and espionage.

### **DOMINICAN REPUBLIC**

#### **A. Strength of the Communist Party and Fronts**

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GP Membership: Negligible

Sympathizers: Negligible

GP Voting Strength: Illegal

Strength of Major Fronts: None

**B. Special Capabilities**

Communists are incapable of seizing the government by force or electoral means, or of influencing the activities of legal political parties. They do have limited capabilities for organizing opposition elements in exile.

**ECUADOR**

**A. Strength of the Communist Party and Fronts**

GP Membership: 2,000

Sympathizers: 4,000

GP Voting Strength: 12,000 (November 1955)

Strength of Major Fronts:

Confederation of Ecuadorian Workers: 40,000 (estimated 1953)

University Students Federation of Ecuador: 16,000 (claimed 1955)

**B. Capabilities**

The Communist Party is incapable of seizing the government by force. It currently has no political alliances and probably will not have in the foreseeable future, since it is apparent that the other parties consider it a political liability. The Party does not have the ability to influence effectively national elections. The Communists are incapable of subverting the country's current political leadership. Through its complete or partial control of the major labor unions, the Party

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occasionally is successful in engineering isolated strikes that are mildly embarrassing to the government. Although it has tried several times, the Party has not shown the capability of touching off a nation-wide work stoppage. Communists could undoubtedly carry out sabotage missions on a small scale, particularly against the vulnerable railroads, but they have no organized sabotage teams or equipment at the present time. The Party has demonstrated the ability to instigate student demonstrations and small-scale Indian uprisings on individual haciendas, but has not developed a serious action since the student demonstrations of December 1955. The Party's capability for prolonged guerrilla action is insignificant. It has neither the arms, training, or manpower to carry out any independent armed struggle on a major scale. Party penetration of the armed forces is insignificant.

### EL SALVADOR

#### A. Strength of the Communist Party and Fronts

CP Membership: 400

Sympathizers: 600

CP Voting Strength: Illegal

#### Strength of Major Fronts:

Construction Workers' Union: 500

Printers' Union: 400

Shoemakers' Union: 500

#### B. Capabilities

Communists are incapable of seizing the government by force or electoral means. Infiltration of government and of legal political parties is slight. They have some capability for influencing student activities through a disproportionate influence in the University Students Association, and are making progress within trade union groups. The return of expelled Communists from abroad and the possible lack of firm anti-Communist measures by the government may favor some expansion of Communist influence in labor.

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**GUATEMALA**

**A. Strength of the Communist Party and Fronts**

**CP Membership:** 300

**Sympathizers:** 1,500

**CP Voting Strength:** Illegal

**Strength of Major Fronts:** None Active

**B. Capabilities**

Communists are incapable of seizing the government by force or electoral means or of influencing the activities of legal political parties. They are possibly capable of fomenting a strike of railroad employees, fruit company workers, or students. Such activity could be controlled by the government. Outside of Guatemala, Communists are able to influence, though not control, some other exiled political opposition groups.

**HAITI**

**A. Strength of the Communist Party and Fronts**

**CP Membership:** None (party not known to be currently organized)

**Sympathizers:** 65

**CP Voting Strength:** Illegal

**Strength of Major Fronts:** None

**B. Capabilities**

Communists are incapable of seizing the government by force or

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electoral means, or of significantly influencing the activities of existing political parties. Communists or their sympathizers have very limited capabilities for influencing intellectuals and labor, and would be unable to initiate or control demonstrations or disruptive activity.

**HONDURAS**

**A. Strength of the Communist Party and Fronts**

**CP Membership:** 400

**Sympathizers:** 545

**CP Voting Strength:** Illegal

**Strength of Major Fronts:** None

**B. Capabilities**

Communists are incapable of seizing the government by force or electoral means, or of influencing the activities of legal political parties. They have limited capabilities for influencing labor (particularly in the north coast banana region), teachers, and students. Communists are capable of giving guidance to labor organization and possibly could stimulate disruptive strike activity in the north coast area.

**MEXICO**

**A. Strength of the Communist Party and Fronts**

**CP Membership:**

**CP Mexico:** 3,000

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**Popular Party: 35,000**

**Workers' and Peasants' Party: 750**

**Sympathisers:**

**CP Mexico: 9,000**

**Popular Party: 40,000**

**Workers' and Peasants' Party: 750**

### CP Voting Strength:

**Popular Party: 72,484 (1952)**

### Strength of Major Fronts

**General Confederation of Mexican Workers and Peasants:**  
**20,000 (estimated 1955)**

**Confederation of Mexican Youth:**  
**40,000 (estimated 1955)**  
**93,000 (claimed 1956)**

**Mexican Communist Youth: 500 (estimated 1954)**

**Institute of Mexican Russian Cultural Exchange: 2,500**

**Mexican Peace Movement: 1,000 (estimated 1955)**

**Workers' University: 250-500 (faculty and students)**

**Democratic Union of Mexican Women: 500 (estimated 1955)**

**Circle of Mexican Studies: 123 (1955)**

**National Educational Workers' Union: 80,000 - 110,000**

**(estimated 1955); Current affiliation with international**

**Communist teachers' front (FIEE) uncertain, but leader-**

**ship heavily infiltrated by Communists and sympathisers.**

### B. Capabilities

Communists are incapable of seizing the government by force or electoral means. Aided by extensive Soviet support, however, Communists and their sympathisers are believed able to influence ultra-nationalist political figures within the administration. In some areas, Communists and sympathisers have sufficient popular support to bring pressure to bear on local political leaders. In certain industries, such as agriculture, railroads, mining, electric power, and petroleum, they could probably stimulate local disruptive strike activity. They are capable of exerting significant influence within the

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educational field, through control or infiltration of students' and teachers' organizations.

**NIGARAQUA**

**A. Strength of the Communist Party and Fronts**

**CP Membership:** 149

**Sympathizers:** 167

**CP Voting Strength:** Illegal

**Strength of Major Fronts:** None

**B. Capabilities**

Communists are incapable of seizing the government by force or electoral means, or of influencing legal political parties. They have extremely limited influence and no special capabilities.

**PANAMA**

**A. Strength of the Communist Party and Fronts**

**CP Membership:** 110

**Sympathizers:** 200

**CP Voting Strength:** Illegal

**Strength of Major Fronts:**

**Federation of Workers' Unions of the Republic of Panama:**  
under 200 (estimated 1955)

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**B. Capabilities**

Communists are incapable of seizing the government by force or electoral means. They are incapable of initiating or controlling riots, uprisings, street fighting, or other disruptive action. The Communist Party is incapable of subverting the country's political leadership, although Diogenes de la ROSA, not a known CP member, may be a source of pro-Communist influence on the President of Panama.

**PARAGUAY**

**A. Strength of the Communist Party and Fronts**

**CP Membership:** 500

**Sympathizers:** 1,000

**CP Voting Strength:** Illegal

**Strength of Major Fronts:** None

**B. Capabilities**

The Communist Party cannot seize power in the foreseeable future by virtue of any independent action. Should the government permit a limited amount of political activity by the Liberals, the leading opposition party, it would undoubtedly increase the capabilities of the Communists who would thereby have both the Colorado and Liberal parties as cover for their own subversive activity. However, such increase in Communist capabilities would be relatively insignificant. It is not foreseen that either of the two traditional parties would ever form an alliance with the Communists. Both the Colorado and Liberal parties are reported to harbor, either wittingly or otherwise, a number of intellectual Communists. The Communists have and will continue to engineer strikes, but probably not of a magnitude which would create an economic or political crisis any greater than that emanating from the usual course of events in the country. The Communists are considered to be well organized for insurrectionary activities which could be embarrassing to the government in localized

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instances, but probably not on a country-wide basis without outside help. The armed forces are capable of restoring peace against such Communist activity. In such activity, the Communists could probably count only on their own militants for support. The extent of Communist penetration in the armed forces is insignificant. Communists are not believed to have any appreciable stocks of armaments. They have limited capabilities for espionage activities.

### PERU

#### A. Strength of the Communist Party and Fronts

CP Membership: 6,000

Sympathizers: 27,500

CP Voting Strength: Illegal

Strength of Major Fronts:

The "Gorger" United Youth Union, Student Section: 1,000  
(claimed 1950)

#### B. Capabilities

The Communist Party does not have the capabilities to seize power by revolutionary means. However, if the Party is able to obtain control of the executive committees of the principal labor unions, which is one of its major aspirations at this time, it would be possible to call strikes and initiate work stoppages of great magnitude, possibly throughout the greater part of Peru.

The current regime has allowed the Communists almost complete freedom of action even though the Party is still an illegal one. The Party has taken advantage of this freedom to reorganize and strengthen its ranks. Neither have special laws been enacted to proscribe Communist activities or publications. The main center of Communist activity continues to be in southern Peru, especially Cuzco where the Communists control many important political positions and labor and cultural groups.

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**URUGUAY**

**A. Strength of the Communist Party and Fronts**

**CP Membership:** 1,750

**Slav Communists resident in Uruguay:** 1,500

**Spanish Communists resident in Uruguay:** 1,300

**Sympathizers:** 20,000

**CP Voting Strength:** 19,500 (November 1954)

**Strength of Major Fronts:**

**General Union of Workers:** 55,000 (estimated 1956)

**The "Peace and Friendship" League:** "unites hundreds of sportsmen" (claimed 1956)

**B. Capabilities**

The Communist Party is not in a position to attempt seizure of power. Capabilities of the Party in the political field are rather limited but will probably expand as a result primarily of the faltering Uruguayan economy and in some cases government negligence toward internal security. It is evident that the Party, without serious difficulties, continues to infiltrate key positions in the government and prominently in the other principal political parties of the country. It is doubtful that the Party will go beyond its abortive effort to form a coalition with the Socialist Party and try to form any overt political coalition with the other major political factions of the Colorado or Nationalists parties. The Party in the last six months has attempted to form a Central Union Federation embracing all labor unions which could provide the basis for increased political power. However, this also to date has gained the adherence of those unions that were already Communist controlled. Should the Party attempt to organize a Central Union Federation be successful, it is doubtful that there would be any marked increase in the number of votes that the Party would receive in a national election. Any increase in the political power of the Party is more likely to come from the election of crypto-Communists infiltrated into the factions of the other major political parties. The Party, although relatively small and having little

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political prestige compared to the historical political parties of the country, does have the ability to subvert some segments of Uruguayan political leadership. This appears not only to be a principal target of the Party, but also a target of the Soviet diplomatic representation in the country. The Party has the capabilities to initiate and carry out strikes and sabotage which would create economic or political crises. This is particularly significant since the Uruguayan economy is in a weakened condition. However, the Party does not have the capability of launching any prolonged guerrilla activity or serious armed struggle. The Party appears to have significant potential to assist the USSR in its espionage mission throughout the River Plate area. It has been established that Montevideo is a center for the distribution of Communist propaganda to other South American countries.

## VENEZUELA

### A. Strength of the Communist Party and Fronts

#### CP Membership:

CP Venezuela: 8,000

Proletarian Revolutionary Party: 1,000

#### Sympathizers:

CP Venezuela: 18,000

#### CP Voting Strength: Illegal

#### Strength of Major Fronts:

Federation of Workers of the Federal District and the State of Miranda: 7,000 (estimated 1955)

### B. Capabilities

Communists are incapable of seizing the government by force or electoral means, or of influencing legal political parties. They are incapable of promoting serious strikes or of initiating or controlling popular uprisings. They are probably capable of carrying out isolated acts of sabotage and of organizing and maintaining an espionage system linked to the Soviets through exiled leaders.

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**BRITISH POSSESSIONS**  
(British Guiana, Jamaica, Trinidad, and others)

**A. Strength of the Communist Party and Fronts**

**CP Membership:**

British Guiana: 3,000  
Jamaica: 150  
Trinidad: 70  
Others: (no organized party known)

**Sympathisers:**

British Guiana: 7,000  
Jamaica: 500  
Trinidad: 500  
Others: negligible

**CP Voting Strength:**

British Guiana: none (local elections only)  
Jamaica: 150 (estimated 1956)  
Trinidad: 500 (estimated 1956)  
Others: None

**Strength of Major Fronts:**

British Guiana:  
Transport Workers Union: 2118  
Jamaica:  
Jamaica Federation of Trade Unions: Negligible

**B. Capabilities**

British Guiana: The Communist-led Jagan faction dominates the People's Progressive Party, which is capable of winning a majority should legislative elections be resumed. Jaganites control two strong labor unions and the dissident Burnhamite faction (Socialist oriented)

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controls a third, which is affiliated with the WFTU. Communists and sympathizers are capable of winning local elections and initiating minor disruptive sabotage or strikes.

Jamaica: None

Trinidad: None

Others: None

**FRENCH POSSESSIONS**  
(Martinique, Guadeloupe, French Guiana)

**A. Strength of the Communist Party and Fronts**

**CP Membership:** Total 4,700

Martinique: 3,500

Guadeloupe: 1,200

French Guiana: None (party not known to be currently organized)

Sympathizers: total 7,000 - 8,000

Martinique: 3,000 - 4,000

Guadeloupe: 4,000

French Guiana: Negligible

**CP Voting Strength:** Total 74,299

Martinique: 46,915 (1956)

Guadeloupe: 27,384 (1956)

French Guiana: Negligible

**Strength of Major Fronts:**

General Confederation of Labor: total 16,507

in Martinique: 10,979

in Guadeloupe: 4,595

in French Guiana: 933

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**B. Capabilities**

**Martinique:** Communists are capable of influencing departmental and local governmental policies through elected representative. They are able to cooperate at times with the Socialist political majority, thereby increasing their influence in departmental politics. They are very influential in organized labor, and are capable of initiating extensive though not necessarily successful, strike activity.

**Guadeloupe:** Communists are capable of influencing departmental and local governmental policies through elected representatives. They are able to cooperate at times with the Socialists, thereby increasing their influence in departmental politics. They are influential in labor, and are capable of initiating extensive, though not necessarily successful strike activity.

**French Guiana:** None.

**NETHERLANDS POSSESSIONS**  
(Netherlands Antilles and Surinam)

**A. Strength of the Communist Party and Fronts**

**CP Membership:** None (party not known to be organized)

**CP Voting Strength:** None

**Strength of Major Fronts:** None

**B. Capabilities**

**None.**

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**CURRENT MEASURES IN CERTAIN LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES  
AND CANADA DESIGNED TO REDUCE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF  
THE COMMUNIST CONSPIRACY**

**BRITISH HONDURAS**

No information is available concerning current measures against the Communist movement in the crown colony of British Honduras. There is little evidence that an organized Party does, in fact, exist.

**COSTA RICA**

Numerical strength: 300

The Communist Party of Costa Rica (Partido Vanguardia Popular or PVP) is small, illegal, but quite well-organized and comparatively active, particularly in the field of labor. The government of Costa Rica, interested in Communist activities only insofar as these affect the local political scene, apparently believes in a policy of "live and let live".

**CUBA**

Numerical Strength: 10,000 - 15,000

The Batista administration in Cuba is officially anti-Communist; actually, it does not regard Communism as a primary problem and continues to be lax about pursuing a genuinely anti-Communist program. In 1953 Cuba outlawed the Communist Party (Partido Socialista Popular or PSP) and broke off diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, recently it rejected Soviet overtures for a Soviet trade mission in Cuba. The government's principal measure designed to combat the effectiveness of Communism has been the creation of the Bureau for the Repression of Communist Activities (BRAC). Although BRAC has been slow in

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getting started, its initial activities having been confined to identification of Communists in various strata of Cuban society, steps have been taken during the past months to expand and make BRAC an aggressive unit. Its potential for taking effective action against the Communist Party is now good, but whether it will do so is problematical because the government regards the threat posed by other opposition groups as more immediate than that created by the Communist conspiracy.

Although Cuban Communist leaders are in hiding, the Party continues to be active, especially in propaganda. During the recent political unrest in Cuba the Communist Party [redacted]

[redacted] local leaders have gone into hiding until the political atmosphere clears. The government has no program under way to stop or counteract Party propaganda, although it does intercept such propaganda when discovered by chance. BRAC has also created a counter-propaganda section. Legislation exists for restricting the international travel of Communists and for the removal of Communists from employment in public service organizations. This legislation is not rigidly enforced, although in recent months several Communists have been removed from positions of leadership in trade unions.

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### EL SALVADOR

Numerical strength: 400

Although President Jose Maria Lemus has recently expressed in confidence his concern over the growing Communist problem, his government, as far as is known, has taken no steps to limit Communist activity. His concern is justified, for since his inauguration in September 1956, the Communist threat has materially increased. To achieve what Lemus calls "democratic reform", he has successfully urged the repeal of the measure which outlawed the Communist Party.

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and he has also permitted the return of all Salvadoran exiles, including Communist leaders. These acts have strengthened the Communists particularly in the field of labor, enabling them to win a major victory in a recent labor congress. In late 1966 a Communist youth organization and a women's Communist organization were founded in El Salvador. U.S. authorities are now negotiating a new Overseas Internal Security Program (formerly 1290-d) with the Salvadoran government.

### **GUADELOUPE**

Numerical strength: 1,200

The Communist Party, a legal body, has lost much of its influence to the moderate party which has a working majority in each of the two working bodies of the General Council, the Bureau and the Departmental Commission, as well as in the General Council itself. The French government employs no measures to repress the Communist activity on Guadeloupe.

### **GUATEMALA**

Numerical strength: 300

The Guatemalan government is continuing to pursue a program of actively suppressing Communist influence under the guidance of the National Security Police. The functional components of the DGSN consist of the anti-Communist section, judicial police, and secret service. Other components, not under the DGSN but also charged with suppression of subversive activities, include the national police and G-2. All of the above units independently and collectively execute an effective program to combat subversive activity within Guatemala. Although the Communists have succeeded in penetrating the labor movement, their activities are being monitored by the Guatemalan government. The government is also monitoring the Guatemalan Communists who have returned from exile. A central personnel office attached directly to the executive branch is charged with the security screening of government employees. Communist activities are being continuously investigated: persons involved are arrested, deported, or placed under surveillance. Liaison is conducted by the Guatemalan

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government with an American Embassy official for the exchange of information on subversive matters under the terms of Resolution 13 of the Caracas Agreement. A police training program is being conducted by the United States with the complete cooperation of the Guatemalan government. Ways and means of suppressing Communism are stressed in this program.

### **HONDURAS**

Numerical strength: 400

The situation in Honduras favors the expansion of Communist activities. Several recent changes in government-another being expected at any moment-have thrown the political situation into turmoil; and the government is occupied with local politics. Thus far the police services have been ineffective, but a U.S. advisor is now trying to bolster their capabilities by providing training and guidance.

### **MARTINIQUE**

Numerical strength: 3,500

The Communist Party is a legal body allied with the Communist Party of France. The announced defection of Andre Cassin and the formation of his new group has so split and weakened the Communist Party that it did not win any seats in the Municipal Council of Fort de France in the February elections. The French government employs all measures to repress Communist activity on Martinique.

### **MEXICO**

Numerical strength: 3,000

During the past year attempts have been made by the Ambassador

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to bring to the attention of President Ruiz Cortines of Mexico the dangers of the Communist threat to Mexican security, particularly in regard to leftist influence in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Mexican government has not, however, taken action or given any indication of adopting a program of action against the Communist Party. Perhaps the case which most clearly reflects the real feelings of the Mexican government was that of Joaquin Ordoqui. Attempts by the authorities to remove this Cuban revolutionary failed, as important figures in the Mexican government interceded in his behalf. Similarly, with respect to restricting the activities of the Soviet and Soviet bloc diplomatic representatives, nothing concrete has been accomplished.

### NICARAGUA

Numerical strength: 149

The anti-Communist position of the Somoza government of Nicaragua is well-known. The Nicaraguan Communist Party (Partido Socialista de Nicaragua, or PSN) has been illegal for many years and does not operate as an organization even clandestinely. Recent months have shown, however, some increase in the activity of individual Communists or former Communists within various labor unions in Nicaragua. These unions are weak and, for the most part, under the thumb of the government.

### PANAMA

Numerical strength: 110

The Panamanian government does not consider the small, disorganized, illegal Communist Party of Panama (Partido del Pueblo, or PDP) as a significant threat. At present the PDP is incapable of seizing power or of taking other political action independently. The capabilities of the PDP for espionage on behalf of the USSR or Soviet bloc appear insignificant. Public opposition to Communism is bland although the stigma of that ideology has proved to be a deterrent to PDP efforts.


The government considers itself capable of handling effectively any domestic Communist difficulties.

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INTERDEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEE ON INTERNAL SECURITY

ROOM 3529, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE BUILDING

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

ICIS-100197

June 3, 1957

Honorable Allen W. Dulles  
Director  
Central Intelligence Agency  
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. Dulles:

In connection with the 1957 Net Evaluation Report now under preparation, the Director of the National Security Council Net Evaluation Subcommittee. General G. C. Thomas. has requested that ICIS advise him of any modifications it wishes to make in the reports submitted in 1955 and 1956.

By memorandum dated June 12, 1956, to the Executive Secretary, Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security, Mr. William P. Bundy, Deputy Assistant Director, National Estimates, furnished ICIS with a report entitled "Special Report on Communist Strength and Capabilities in the Western Hemisphere". Pursuant to the request by General Thomas the ICIS is now re-examining its previous contributions to the net evaluation report and it will therefore be appreciated if your Agency would bring up to date the information in the above-mentioned special report, especially with regard to the numerical strength of the Communist movement in the Western Hemisphere countries.

Reference is also made to your letter of August 14, 1956, furnishing summaries of current measures in certain Latin American countries and in Canada designed to reduce the effectiveness of the Communist conspiracy. It would also be very helpful if we could receive up-to-date information from you regarding such measures, particularly concerning the attempts of your Agency to secure the cooperation of the appropriate governments in the apprehension of dangerous Communists.

The NSC Subcommittee has asked that ICIS furnish on or before July 1, 1957, any modifications it wishes to make in its previous reports. It will therefore be greatly appreciated if you could respond to this letter by June 17, 1957.

Sincerely yours,

J. Walter Yeagley  
Chairman, Interdepartmental Committee  
on Internal Security

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